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SECTION II
GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL STABILITY FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
Mike Kwanashie 1
I.

INTRODUCTION
The interplay ofpolitics and the economy has for long been recogniz.ed as a major
factor influencing the growth ofnations, despite the tendency to treat both as independent
processes. The process of allocating scarce resources among competing ends (consider
the purview ofeconomics) and the process ofconflict resolution arising from the distribution
of resources and exercise of power (considered the purview of politics) are closely
intertwined especially in a developing country like Nigeria. The exercise of power and
authority in both the political and economic spheres is the essence of governance.
Governance-the exercise ofpolitical power for the direction and management of50eiety
- links decision-making processes, institutions and structures to the economic environment.
It is importanttoacknowledge that governance and political stability are central to economic
development. The link between good governance and economic development is clear.
This point has to be made behind the backdrop of the dominant development paradigm in
most developing countries that presumes a benign state that operates on the basis of how
best to maximize social welfare. The state is, no doubt, a leading actor in the development
process of most developing countries. But the state in many of these countries cannot be
described as benign. The objective of regime survival which is often paramount to
governments in these countries is often pursued in a manner that undermines development
and in many ofthem marginalizes the greater segment of society. While in many developed
democracies survival strategies could actually involve seeking to maximize collective utility
by positively influencing the state ofthe economy, in developing countries the regime survival
is not necessarily associated with the perfom1ance ofthe economy. Indeed in many cases
the state had looted the economy to sustain itself. Yet economists would tend to a-.sun1e
that good go\'crnance would ordinarily entail optimal intervention in the l.'Conomy to correct
market failures so as to enable the society to achieve its objectives. Society is said to be
better on: than othernise. ,,.ith government opcrclling with the intention ofimproving socil.1}
Professor i,f\fconomics and Director. Institute for Development Research. Ahmadu Bdfo·IJniversit} . Zaria
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by removing any obstacle to the advancement ofthe welfare of society and creating the
environment for it to happen. Non-opcimal state action is often recognized and
acknowledged, but the economist tend~ to dismiss them as deviation from rational and
expected trends. The fact is that sustained non-optimal behavior could actually be a result
of the political process. The interests of the politician, the bureaucrat, the political class,
and the dominant forces in society are very often not consistent with the preferences the
entire society. The political process can sustain such divergence, making non-optimality a
fact oflife. The Nigerian experience clearly demonstrates that government can be captured
by self-seeking elite intent on plundering the nation's wealth. Nigeria had struggled to gain
independence with the hope that governments would promote the public interest, only to
find that public resources have been diverted for private benefit and that power is been
retained by violent and arbitrary means.
Nigeria has since the colonial period witnessed the central role of the state in the
development process. The Nigerian state remains a principal actor in the drama ofdecades
of underdevelopment and could be said to be, to a large extent, responsible for it. The
nature and character of the state have impacted significantly on the performance of the
economy and the ability of society to meet its objectives. In this paper we would like to
examine the extent to which the various regime types have influenced the development
process. Since the colonial period Nigeria had experience basically two regime types authoritarian regimes under military dictatorships and democratic regimes under civilian
authorities. The two regime types differ fundamentally in the way they exercise power and
authority. In liberal democracies the exercise ofpower and authority tends, more or less,
to be moderated by the rule oflaw, separation of powers, free elections, institutional
pluralism, and respect for fundamental human rights. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast,
exercise power and authority arbitrarily. In consequence, they are apt to be politically
repressive, and they typically exhibit a relentless drive to perpetuate themselves in power.
A major question to ask now that Nigeria has again been freed from military dictatorship
and can claim liberal democracy is how strong is the correlation between regime types and
economic development? Especially in a country like Nigeria where the distinction between
the military and civilian segments ofthe ruling class is blurred. A major aspect ofgovernance
in both types of regime in the past has been lack of accountability and transparency in the
management ofthe economy.
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The issues ofgovernance '.1nd political instability are central to the analysis ofthe
failed ~ttempt at development in Nigeria. After almost four decades ofpost-independence
existence, Nigeria has not witnessed a stable political environment and has livedfor most
ofthat period under military dictatorship. The country has failed, especially when compared
to some developing countries at similar stage of development in the 1960s, to build a
sustainable economy that could address the basic needs of her population. Yet a cursory
examination ofthe endowments ofthe nation would show that in natural and hwnanresources
and other conventional prerequisites for development and growth, Nigeria remains one of
the most endowed nations in Africa and indeed, the world. One important observation is
that unlike in some ofthe countries that could be compared to Nigeria, the level ofpolitical
stability and quality ofleadership has posed serious problems. lnability to fashion out
conflict resolution strategies and consensus building mechanism has resulted in wasted
years on war, civil strives, and military dictatorship. The observed endowments have been
translated into material upliftment for the majority ofthe population. The paradox ofthe
country's situation is that it has proved incapable oftransforming the enorm_Qus opportunities
it has into positive achievements that would impact on the lives of the masses of the
country. One major reason usually advanced for this situation is the absence ofgood and
purposeful governance. The apparent inability of the nation's leaders to mobilize the
population for creative employment that would facilitate the process ofwealth creation is
a major factor in explaining the Nigerian experience. Worst still is the fact that the ruling
elites have deliberately impoverished the country by looting and plundering it
Leadership has to be seen at various levels. The Nigerian case is that ofleadership
failure at virtually all levels. From the family, the primary social groupings to the various
political and administrative levels, the Nigerian situation shows graphic collapse of
governance. Nigeria with all its resources is still one ofthe poorest nations in the world.
We are faced with a system collapse manifested by the frequent usurpation of political
power by the military elite, institutionalization of corruption, lack oftransparency and
accountability in the conduct ofpublic affairs, grossly declining productivity. rent seeking
among many others. As a result ofthese, the economy has remained underdeveloped and
the quality oflife ofthe average citiz.en has worsened progressively. Nigerians had virtually
lost faith in their ability to sustain meaningful life within their nation as demonstrated by the
level of exodus by the end of the last military administration. After decades of grossmismanagement and plundering of the economy by successive military and civilian
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administrations we are left with a traumatized people, a plundered nation and sharpened
contradiction within society. The issue ofethnic minority rights and the crisis ofdemocratic
.. governance has become a major one in the country. Increasingly, Nigeria has been faced
with several severe communal and ethnic minority protest and conflicts. 1broughout the
country ethnic minorities are in ferment. They are striving to shake offa,ge-long USUipations,
and marginalization. The urge to take their own destinies in their own hands is fuelled by
the:gross mismanagement ofthe Nigerian experiment by a small segment of society and
the age long gross ineptitude of leadership. This is the Nigerian experience. This is the
~hallenge the present democratic experiment has to deal with. The dividends ofdemocracy
which the population eagerly awaits will be a mirage unless a radical economic and social
transformation is initiated in the country by the current administration. The current effort at
accountability and transparency by the administration is a first step in the right direction.
2.
THE STATE OF THE NATION.
After 40 years ofpolitical independence Nigerians, in the midst ofvast natural and human
resources, experience poverty and deprivation, as the majority ofthe population can.still
not take for granted basic necessities oflife. The condition ofthe majority ofthe populaticm
worsens by the day and the level of absolute poverty remains on a constant rise. Efforts to
bring about fundamental socio-economic structural changes have been constantly frustrated
both by internal and external forces. Nigeria is again at a crossroads, full ofhope for the
recent transition to. democracy in the country. Nigerians are full ofexpectations that the
democratization ofthe political system would translate into economic progress. 1be country
has, however, been in this situation before and ended up in frustration and a military coup.
The question is why the 1960 and 1979 civilian governments failed? Lessons should be
drawn from these experiences for the current democratic experiment. The circumstance
that led to the first military coup in Nigeria has been hotly ~bated in Nigeria. The legacy
of that coup will ever remain, and would continue to shape Nigeria's political landscape.
The military has, since then, significantly changed the political space in Nigeria. They have
radically changed the nature !llld character of the political class and infused a political
culture that would for a long time continue to dominate politics in the country. They were
able to do this through the control ofthe economy and the reckless mis-managem~nt ofthe
huge resources accruing from it. The nation's resources were used to create.and consolidate
a political class, into which elements ofthe military would graduate and whose resources

13 CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW VOL. 38 NO. 4

base enables them to buy over the political process. This is the reality ofthe Nigerian case.
A situation in which there is a conspiracy between elements ofthe military and the political
class with a view to sustaining a political and economic system that marginalizes the majority
of the population and facilitates the mass expropriation of national wealth by the ruling
class.
Under this circumstance, Nigerians must ask what the difference is between the
present democratic experiment and that ofl979. On the one hand, it has been argued that
the military after tasting power for so long was not prepared to remain out ofthe political
arena. Hence after handing over power i'n 1979 waited in the wings for an opportunity to
return. On the other hand it is argued that the opportunity was given by the civilian
administration when it failed to govern and to enthrone a culture of accountability and
transparency for which the military was not known to have had. 1ne political class continued
the plunder ofthe economy and could not show any marked difference from the military.
There are lessons to be learnt from this experience. The problem is that the political class
in Nigeria is yet to appreciate and accept its possible role in the liberation of the Nigerian
people because its own interests are far from those ofthe people. Manipulating primordial
sentiments and relying on primitive social relations, they have been able to give an impression
ofoneness with the people. This has been sustained since the colonial period, but evidence
suggests that it can now only be sustained in the short run, given the rapidly changing
environment
The political class in Nigeria, as in many developing countries, is different from
those in liberal democracies of the West. In the West the preoccupation is with reelection.
The political class tends to address this by improvements in the level of income of a large
segment ofthe population, employment creation and price stability. The skills to handle
classic policy instruments such as fiscal , financial, monetary, price, exchange rate and
trade policies are central to the survival strategies ofpolitical parties in power. 1ne population
expects and actively demands effective management ofthe economy as a precondition for
support of the government in power and such potentials from contenders for power. In
developing countries the issue of re-election is handled differently and is not seen as a
constraint in the terms that it is seen in the West. The political class in developing countries
is accustomed to looting the nation's resources as insurance for reelection or election at
the expense of economic development and growth. The class is not accountable to any
other group but to itself. It has the traditional and often primitive instruments ofcontrol
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and is thus not concerned with the performance ofdie economy as a way ofself- survival.
The emergence ofthe military was initially heralded as a possible check to the excesses of
the political class, but in most cases they have proven to be worse and have conspired
with the political class to continue the oppression and marginalization ofthe population.
The Nigerian economy has. since independence, undergone changes which have
resulted in numerous distortions that have undermined the growth potentials ofthe country.
Despite the acknowledged size of natural resources and the potentials of her huge
population, Nigeria in the last two decades, has failed to bring about fundamental structural
changes which are necessary to launch the nation onto a path of sustained economic
prosperity. The very low growth trajectory that characterized the colonial economy still
persists despite the opportunities and potentials thac exist. Periods of boom occasioned by
developments in the world oil market have be€n experienced but not sustained. Central to
this performance is severe domestic policy shortcomings and lack of political will to
implement appropriate policies. Inept leadership was reflected in poor management and in
many instances culpable negligence. The economy's self-adjustment response mechanism
was undermined by corruption, lack ofaccountability and transparency. Nigeria's economic
crisis has manifested itselfmost clearly in the disintegration ofthe productive and infrastructural
facilities. Agricultural output and particularly food production has been substantially reduced
from the high levels ofthe immediate post independence period. At present most ofNigeria's
industries are operating much below their installed capacities. The physical infrastructure
built during the immedi~te post-independence era, has, to a large extent, deteriorated due
to poor maintenance and lack ofrenovation and ntw investments in these areas have not
resulted in major changes. Social services and welfare. especially education, public health
and sanitation, housing and potable water, have rapidly deteriorated. The emergence of a
monocultural economy, following the gradual demise ofthe leading role ofagriculture in
stimulating growth, has created serious problems for the stability ofthe economy. Nigeria
is confronted with a host ofadverse external economic conditions, particularly with respect
to the collapse in the prices ofprimary -commodities, mounting external indebtedness and
decreasing net flows of public and private resources.
3.

THE DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE
1be slow pace ofdevelopment in Nigeria can be traced to the structural disarticulation
ofthe ecommy which has been sustained by poor governance culture and political instability.

15 CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVI EW VOi.. 38 NO. 4

It has been in the interest of the ruling class to maintain this structure since it has made it
possible for them to control and manipulate it. The structural problems ofthe economy can
be traced to the colonial period. The coloniru state played an important role in strucmring
the economy. The colonial economy was particularly design to create surplus. allow for
maximum expatriation of such surplus. The economy was constructed on the basis of
export of primary commodities in which Nigeria was said to have comparative advantage.
Large foreign trading companies promoted.trade in manufactures in exchange for the primary
commodities produced by peasant farmers. Agriculture was the most important sector of
the economy, with the largest share ofGDP. employment. and export earnings. This.economy
integrated the producer to foreign markets. Peasant producers who constituted the major
segment of the Nigerian productive class were basically active participants in the global
markets for their commodities. The colonial administration ensured that conditions for this
relationship was created and nurtured. Marketing boards were established to facilitate
both production and marketing of commodities and to stabilize prices. At the center of the
system was a process of surplus extraction. Peasant farmers were made to bear the burden
of development while creating the surplus necessary to sustain the colonial system. There
was an element of exploitation and suppression in the system. The colonial economy did
not actively encourage industrialization since the colonial administration did not want to
undermine the trade in industrial goods between the territory and th...: home country. Large
trading companies o perating in the country were reluctant to pursue domestic production.
T he colo nial government was central to the c peration o f the economy. Their interests
determined policy and the structure ofth..: economy. Governance was a critical factor in
shaping the economy and in laying the foundation the country inherited after independence.
The neo-colonial structure of the economy was derived from the colonial economy.
It was designed initially to facilitate the continuation of surplus extraction and expatriation
by large foreign trading companies. The economy in the 1960s was still basically an agrarian.
dependent on primary producers of major export commodities. The weak industrial base
persisted during this period even though government made some attempts at encourJging
establishment of industries. T he strnctural distortions and the nature of the disarticulatio1,
o f the economy became manifest in the 1970s. During the 1970s, petroleum emerged and
has since then remained the leading sector of the economy, accounting for more than 90
per cent o f Nigerian exports and over 70 per cent of government revenue. The large
" ·ind fall gain from the quadrupling of crude oil prices in 1973-74 enabled the country not
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only to expand public investment almost three-folds over subsequent years, but also to
build up its foreign reserves which eventually supported conspicuous consumption. Efforts
were made by the government to use the oil revenue to restructure the economy and to
expand the economic base, largely through the establishmentofnumerous public enterprises
and public Investments in large scale industrial projects which were heavily dependent on
imported raw materials. Investments did not create an in-built stabiliz.er for the oil-dependent
economy to enable it avert the instability in the world oil market. The huge oil resources
that accrued to the nation during this period represented such a leap in resources available
for development Nigeria was recovering from her civil war and was engaged in rehabilitation
and reconstruction. Faulty economic policies articulated during this period reflects the
quality ofgovernance. The military was in control and was beginning to change its character
and forge alliances with the political class in the face of massive resources at its disposal.
The military was beginning to discover that authoritarian regimes have the capacity to
appropriate large shares of society's resources without much challenge. The musical chairs
played by the military since this period demonstrates the weakness of the military as an
institution capable of utilizing the enormous resources from oil for development. Each
regime accuses the one it overthrows of massive corruption and looting of the treasury
only to be so accused by the next. Bad governance and instability robbed the nation of the
opportunity of using the oil revenue for development The economics ofthe period influenced
the ruling elite and the quality of governance which in tum undermined the economy.
The present phase of the crisis of the economy which manifested itself with the
sharp fall in the international oil prices in the early l 980s began with the virtual collapse of
the economy. This brought home forcefully the weakness ofthe structure of the economy.
The country found itself in serious difficulties including large negative growth of GOP
against high population growth rate. deficits in trade and current account balances and
government budget. and a massive increase in external debt. GDP per capita declined
from around US$ l .000 in 1980 to US$250 in 1992. The heavy dependence ofthe economy
on petroleum and imported inputs made the economy highly vulnerable to external changes.
particularly those in world demand and prices for petroleum. Various macroeconomic
indicators continue to show the depth of the crisis. The average growth rate of real GOP
between l 981 and 1985 was -0. l 8 percent manifesting the intensity of the crisis of the
early 80s. The growth rate of the real GOP was. on the average. 0. 93 percent between
1989 and 1994. The rate has continued to fall since then. from 8.2 percent in 1990 to 2 .9

17 CBN ECONOMIC & FINANC IAL REVIEW VOL. 38 NO. 4

percent in 1992 and 1.3 percent in 1994. The real growth rate was estimated at 2 .5
percent in 1995, 4 .3 percent, 3.6 percent and 2.3 percent for 1996, I-997, and 1998
respectively. The rate ofinflation was endemic during the SAP period with the exception
of 1987 and 1990 when inflation rates were 10.2 and 7 .5 percent, respectively. For other
years, the rate ofinflation was unprecedented, especially for 1988 and 1993 when inflation
rates were 56.1and 57.2 percents respectively. The inflation rate was 72.8 percent in
1995 but decelerated o I 0.0 percent by 1998. Capacity utiliz.ation in the manufacturing
sector decreased from pre-SAP level of about 40.0 percent to the 1989 level of about
25.0 percent. It has since reduced significantly. During the SAP period, the financial sector
seemed to have responded to the various changes put in place.such as the deregulation of
the interest rate resulting in an increase in the number offinancial and non-financial institutions.
But the financial sector also experienced several policy reversals, for instance, in 1991 and
1994 resulting in serious distress in the sector. Government privatization programme has
not resulted in the restructuring that was expected. By 1993, over 86 enterprises had been
privatiz.ed under the adjustment programme, mostly through public offers on the Nigerian
Stock Exchange. Debt overhang continue to be a serious threat to Nigeria's economic
future. At the end of 1998, the stock of debt disbursed and outstanding stood at an
estimated US$28.8 billion, and ofthis some US$ l 7. 7 billion, representing arrears, almost
entirely to Paris Club ofcreditors. The country built up large fiscal and external deficits and
other macroeconomic imbalances ensuroo. Internal and external imbalances in the light of
the heavy dependence on the oil sector intensified. The military which was in pow~r for
most of this period were completely incapable of reversing the massive decline in the
economy. By this time the military had lost almost all vestiges of credibility. The Nigerian
state had become very weak due to the loss oflegitimacy in the eyes of the population
resulting from the massive plundering ofthe economy, increasing poverty and the harsh
political climate sustained by the military. The politicization ofthe military undermined the
authority of the military. The strong dose ofauthoritarianism was felt only in the areas of
human rights violations and the lack of accountability and transparency that characteriz.ed
military rule. The rnilitary retained its solid grip on society and facilitated private accumulation
of national wealth by a tiny segment of society. Fully backed by the political class that
stood to benefit from the military, they did what they wanted. The fundamental restructuring
which is required to liberate the economy from the clutches ofthe tiny minority that continue
to bleed it dry has always been resisted because it must. to be effective, affect social
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relations and property rights. The inability of successive military administrations which
often came to power complaining of the poor performance of the economy to address
these fundamental issues have resulted in widespread and persistent crisis ofthe economy.
As a result, the foreign debt which was considered unnecessary dl.lriQg the oil boom-period
became a veritable source of financing the country's external obligations and bridging the
resource gap for the country's development. Between 1970 and 1994 total debt increased
phenomcmally.
Military administrations are said to be in a better position to push through unpopular
economic policy. The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes(SAP) under
military regime was thus expected to be more effective. The experience ofNigeria has not
proven this point. The military in Nigeria despite its authoritarianism was not able to push
through various aspects of the programme. Despite over a decade of SAP, the country is
still characterized by distortions and market imperfections which SAP was aimed at
eliminating. In addition to domestic policy shortcomings articulation oftransformation
strategies, are inadequate.

4.

THE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In broad terms we have focused on two types ofregimes in Nigeria. The contrast
seems to be between military and civil rule. In the Nigerian experience the distinction could
also be between the various policy regime type in the sense that both military and civilians
have tended to pursue similar policies at different times. The issue in question here is the
changing role ofthe state in economic development. The state, controlled by the military or
civilians, had in the earlier periods assumed a dominant position m the management ofthe
economy. With the oil boom ofthe 1970s the state took control of the commanding heights
of the economy and saw itself as the moving force behind it. Since the r:·,irl- 1980s the
state, encouraged by foreign interests, has accepted to hand back the economy to the
private sector and to provide only the enabling environment for private enterprise. Policies
changes were expected to follow such decision. Our interest here is to examine how the
various regimes have been able to make this transition and its implication for
development.
The role of the state in Nigena became pronounced during the 1970s following
the experience ofthe economy from independence to the oil boom era. The ability ofthe
private sector to effectively utiliu national resources for development was in doubt. The
neo-colonial economy was more outwards oriented and in tune with the economies ofthe
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metropolitan countries. The pace of industrialization was very slow, foreign investment in
critical sectors of the economy was not forthcoming and the general dominance of the
economy by foreign traders encouraged the state to take more interest in the economy
with the aim of promoting economic development. Two regime types are compared here
- the regimes under national planning and the laissez faire regimes. We could say that the
various regimes up to 1986 were in the first type while the post-1986 regimes are i-n the
second.
National economic planning in one form or the other is practiced in virtually all
countries. The idea that the state should influence the workings ofthe economic system is
as old as the emergence of modern economies. Various reasons have been given for why
this is necessarily so. The turbulence associated with the arrival ofcapitalism in the nineteenth
century eucouraged systematic planning of many economies around the world. Between
1917 and 1950 some countries in reaction to what they considered the injustices ofcapitalism
experimented in a construction ofan altemati ve system. This experiment gave planning a
new image and emphasized central control and direction. Most other countries especially
the new independent states which [i.)und themselves late starters in the development race
opted for a hybrid of both systems. Development planning for them was not necessarily
involved with central planning and control but a combination of govemmeot participation
and direction within a market economy. In most of these countries, however the state
played a leading role. The state occupied the commanding heights of the economy and
took key decisions. Nigeria joined in this rank. Nigeria's experiem:e with planning has not
been that encouraging. Governments were not held accountable for plan targets. The.
annual disbursement of resources often bore no relationship with set targets in the plans.
Thus, while the concept of government intervention was taken for granted there was no
mechanism to ensure that such intervention was in the public interest. The management of
the economy in the I 970s demonstrated this point. H •.1ge amount ofresources were expended
on projects that were of little benefit to the system. The state became a vehicle for private
accumulation ofpublic wealth.
With the virtual collapse of the economy in the early 1980s it was cleai that the
state had failed in its attempt to manage the economy. The intervening state, controlling the
commanding heights of the economy had unwittingly run the system aground. With the
expansion oftrade and greater interdependence among countries, the locus of growth and
development was being shifted out ofthe nation. The moving forc;e of development was
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not necessarily to be found within the nation. Globalization has further pushed the question
ofthe efficacy of national planning. Moving the focus ofdevelopment to the international
level, the question becomes what role is there for the nation state? If globalization results in
a borderless world, what meaning would national planning have? Nigeria accepted tc
restructure the economy in 1986 with the introduction ofSAP. The government committed
itself to a market based, private sector led, liberal economy in which the state would
provide only the enabling environment for private initiatives. From this point the question
became how to hand over the economy to the private sector when oil revenue still accrued
solely to the state and where power was concentrated with the state sustained by the flow
of these resources? What adjustments would the political class have to make to retain
power over the control of national resources? These questions have undermined the
adoption of genuine adjustment policies. If the pre- 1986 regimes judged against the
background ofnational planning failed, those ofthe post- 1986 judge against the background
ofliberaliz.ation have sti-11 a long way to go.
Given the performance ofboth regime types the question is how the present regime
in the country should proceed. It is a historical fact that, with quite minor excepti ms, the
latter a political-economic unit has embarked on a serious development effort and greater
the disparities between its own levels ofinstitutional and productive forces and those of
highly developed political-economic units, the greater has been the role of the State.
Regardless oftheir attitudes towards private enterprise or income distribution, states starting
development late and at a comparative disadvantage have found massive social and
economic intervention essential. The dominant paradigm today however call for a redefinition
of the role of the state in economic activities. The process in most developing countries
who musl deal with the international eommunity to facilitate development has been that of
rebalancing the public and the private sectors. Liberalization must however be defined
within the context ofthe ability ofmarkets to function properly and for the interest of tht
majority ofthe population to be protected. The challenge to the state is even greater now
than in the pre-1986 period. The state, even under the liberalized environment still has
critical regulatory and management functions. For example, the incredibly complex distortions
in commodity prices now prevailing arc the unplanned macroeconomic outcome ofspecific
microeconoinic interventions. But substantial fragmentation in the markets for land labour
and capital provided the initial motivation for public authorities to · do something·. We
have to contrasr this to the tenets ofliberal classical doctrine that the free and unimpeded
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mechanism ofmarket forces would lead to-a maximum national income. Disregarding an
ethical value judgment about personal income distribution and special cases of increasing
returns to scale the maximum would also be an optimum national income. Any conscious
deliberate active economic policy designed to influence the amount and composition of
investment could not, according to this school, raise national income in the long run.
Globalization has created its own challenges to the state in developing countries. Behind
the force of globalization is a technological revolution which is altering fundamentally and
radically all aspects of business, industry and manufacturing. At the core are the new
information and communications technologies. Information technology combines progress
in electronics, computing, and telecommunications to come up with a highly dynamic
process ofstoring, processing, transmitting and presentation ofinformation. lbis has created
capacities for new and efficient resp<1nses to age-old problems. More efficient production
processes are now possible and countries with the capacity are adopting them in a bid to
maintain a competitive edge within the changing global environment. Countries are now in
a better position to respond speedily to changes in demand patterns and changes in
international comparative advantages. The Nigerian state has a responsibility ofensuring
that the country takes advantage ofthese developments since the private sector is still too
weak to respond adequately to these developments. The state has to increase efforts at
capacity building to improve on the ability ofthe economy to respond.

S.

CONCLUSIONS

The state in Nigeria has, since independence failed to be developmental . Various
regime types have been experienced but none has been able to promote sustainable
development because the essence ofthe state has been anti-developmental. Strong vested
interests have always wielded political power and succeeded in expropriating national
resources at the expense of development. The logic of the state has been to expropriate
national resources for the exclusive use of the ruling class - military and civil. The role of
governance and political stability is critical for economic development. The Nigerian
experience has, however, shown that the state has been an instrument of exploitation and
suppression rather than an instrument for development.
Globalization has again pointed out that tl:e issue for development is not a choice
between planning and laissez-faire. A critical look at the history ofeconomic development
shows that economic devclopmew is almost invariably a process in which planning and
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freedom ofenterprise is mixed. The usual pattern is one ofa mixture ofbureaucracy and
enterpnse. The main problem with most developing countries is that their economies are
fragmented such that individuals are not able to raise productive investment to the level
necessary to provide for arise of national income substantially in excess of the rise in
population, so that per capita national income increases. Globalization has heightened the
need for rebalancing between tne public and the private sector, particularly in developing
countries. It calls for a wholesale reinvention ofgovernment. The state has to move from
doing many things badly to doing its fewer tasks well. The new communic:ationstechnologies
coming on-line have transformed production processes and brought wealth and power to
those who possess the skills to understand and control them. Developing countries must
face the challenges ofglobalization.
As most countries are now finding out, within the new order major changes and
restructuring are necessary. The rapid spread of international capital has resulted in the
gradual diminish ofnational control ofthe economy. While the information revolution offers
many benefits, -it also poses new challenges. These developments have opened up-new
chances for development for those countries that are still trying to catch up with the developed
world. But these countries must develop the internal structure and the willingness to articulate
policies that enable them Qenefit from these developments. For countries with relatively
strong fundamentals and appropriate policies, openness could help to speed up growth.
Countries that cannot correct internal distortions and create the environment for market
oriented policies to take root are most likely going to suffer the negative aspects of
globalization. Nigeria for example is still very weak internally such that despite its huge
natural resources the level ofpoverty remains unacceptable. To meet the challenges ofthe
emerging new world order and·diminish the pos.sibility ofthreat from major countries in the
international community, Nigeria must effectively mobilize its domestic resources to build a
strong, viable and self-sustaining economy.
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